BY HE QINGLIAN

       In the coming months, HRIC will be publish- ing a new book-length report by noted scholar He Qinglian on the Chinese govern- ment’s increasing use of underworld tactics against rights defenders. In anticipation of wide interest on this subject, the report will be published in both English and Chinese. Following is the preface to the book and the table of contents.

      PREFACE: WHY STUDY OFFICIALLY SANCTIONED CRIME IN CHINA?

       Since 2004, the international community has witnessed a significant political devel- opment in China: in its clampdown against rights activists and their efforts to defend civil and human rights, the government has not only resorted to extreme political vio- lence, but has also extensively relied on criminal organizations and underworld tac- tics. The international community has expressed strong disapproval of this abuse of government power, but otherwise has yet to respond in any meaningful way.

      In fact, this political development began in the late 1990s, accompanying three major concurrent changes in Chinese poli- tics: the privatization of public power (gong- gong quanli), the legalization of political violence and the increasing official use of criminal tactics.1

      In what ways is officially sanctioned crime related to China’s political transfor- mation? No systematic study of this ques- tion has been undertaken. An exploration of officially sanctioned crime must begin with an investigation of China’s criminal underworld. To understand how the Chi- nese government has come to engage in criminal activity, we must first understand the steady infiltration of Chinese politics by criminal organizations.

     I discussed the rise, basic characteris- tics and social impact of criminal organiza- tions in China in chapter 10 of my book The Pitfalls of Modernization (1998).2 Numerous studies on the criminal underworld have been published in China, and many aca- demic specialists are conducting research on China’s criminal organizations. But because China lacks genuine academic free- dom, these studies fail to reflect China’s actual political development, and even lag far behind media reports. While Chinese scholars are still discussing whether crimi-nal organizations actually exist in China,3 many media outlets have exposed the deep infiltration of organized crime (heishehui zuzhi) into China’s economy and political system.The reason why Chinese scholars remain at square one in their research is that to date,the Chinese government has only acknowledged that “mafia-style criminal gangs”(heishehui xingzhi de fanzuituanhuo)have appeared in China,4 but has never

    Table of Contents

    Preface:

    Why Study Officially Sanctioned Crime in China?

    Chapter 1:

    A Survey of Organized Crime in China

    i. The Rise of the Criminal Underworld in China ii. Types of Criminal Organizations

    iii. The Distribution and Characteristics of China’s Criminal Organizations

    iv. The Infiltration of Chinese Politics by the Criminal Underworld

     Chapter 2:

    The Institutional Background of the Criminalization of Chinese Politics

    i. Social Tension as a Breeding Ground for Organized Crime

    ii. Economic Reform, Social Mobility and the Growth of the Criminal Underworld

    iii. Clientelism and the Criminalization of Chinese Politics

    iv. The Police as Protectors of the Criminal Underworld

    Chapter 3:

    The Criminalization of Official Conduct

    i. Infiltration of the Government by Organized Crime

    ii. Chinese Officialdom Adopts the Value System of the Criminal Underworld

    iii. Government Officials in the Shadow Economy

    iv. Political Clientelism as a Conduit for Underworld Involvement in Economic Activity

    Chapter 4:

    Underworld Involvement in the Economy

    i. Organized Crime’s Involvement in the Economy: Monopolizing Markets through Power and Violence

    ii. Illegal Monopolies: Gambling, Entertainment and Smuggling

    iii. Political Protection and the Illegal Management of “Legitimate Industries”

    iv. From Rags to Riches

    Chapter 5:

    Officially Sanctioned Crime and Human Rights

    i. The Violation of Land and Housing Rights since the Late 1990s

    ii. The Destruction of Old Urban Neighborhoods

    iii. Farmers Dispossessed of their Fields and Homes

    Conclusion:

    Officially Sanctioned Crime and Social Injustice

    acknowledged the presence of full-fledged organized crime groups in China.

    International criminologists have reached a general consensus about five defining characteristics of modern criminal organizations, which can also be applied to the study of organized crime in China: 1) There must be a large, stable and enduring criminal group and source of income. 2) The group must have a distinctive mode of action, lifestyle and code that constitutes a criminal subculture. 3) The group’s activi- ties are usually covert, but can become overt for a time under certain circum- stances. 4) The groups differ in their partic-ular criminal activities and the territories in which they are active. 5) The group’s behav-ior and activities are highly predatory, para- sitic and anti-social.

    Judged by these criteria, it must be said that organized crime had already appeared in China by the late 1980s, and that organ- ized crime groups grew in strength and number in the 1990s.

    An alliance between gangsters and local officials has led to the increase in officially sanctioned crime, especially at the grass- roots administrative level. In many locali- ties,criminal organizations protected by local officials have taken over control of cer- tain government functions and key sectors of the economy. They are so powerful that local people refer to them as a “second government.” Since the late 1990s in par- ticular, local governments throughout China have used criminal organizations as goon squads to force urban residents from their homes and seize farmers’ land. The Shengyou Village5 and Taishi Village6 inci- dents are clear examples of local govern- ments working hand in glove with criminal organizations to suppress popular resist- ance, and epitomize the predatory, parasitic and anti-social character of criminal organi- zations.

    To shed light on the principal danger facing China’s political development, this report explores how a growing share of the economy and public life is coming under the control of criminal organizations shielded by government officials, and how the Chinese government increasingly relies on unlawful methods to dominate the popu- lation. The privatization of public power, the official use of criminal tactics and the legit-imization and generalization of violence are the main indicators of the government’s growing reliance on unlawful methods.This political evolution is an inevitable outgrowth of China’s current political system. Now that the ideological myth of “serving the people” has been shattered, violence and force of arms are the regime’s final recourse to preserve its political power.

    The official sanctioning of criminal con- duct in China is a subject that has yet to be investigated by political scientists and soci- ologists. In other countries, collusion between criminal organizations and govern- ment officials is typically confined to the police and judicial authorities, and limited in scope to the business sectors in which criminal organizations specialize. But in China, criminal organizations collude with government officials in the Party, govern- ment administration, finance, judiciary, land management, tax administration and indus- try and commerce, and are involved in many more sectors of the economy than their overseas counterparts. The value sys- tem of the criminal underworld permeates the culture of officialdom and underpins the government’s growing reliance on unlawful methods of control, and while never openly acknowledged, its influence is widely felt.

    Once we understand the criminal meth- ods this unjust system of government is increasingly adopting, the hopeless human rights situation confronting ordinary Chi- nese people becomes all too clear. In the political sphere, ordinary citizens have no rights and are completely powerless to resist oppression by government officials at every level. In everyday life, the official use of criminal tactics has made laws and regu-lations a dead letter, and has led to a breakdown in the social order as ordinary people are forced to endure the rampant violence visited on them by government- hired gangsters.


    Translated by Paul Frank

    NOTES

    1. See He Qinglian, “Weiquan tongzhi xia de Zhongguo xianzhuang yu qianjing” (Current Situation and Perspectives of China under Authoritarian Rule), Dangdai Zhongguo Yanjiu (Modern China Studies), Summer 2004.
    2. He Qinglian, Xiandaihua de xianjing: dangdai Zhongguo de jingji shehui wenti (The Pitfalls of Modernization: Economic and Social Prob-lems in Contemporary China), Beijing: Jinri Zhongguo chubanshe, 1998.
    3. Qiu Geping, “ ‘Heishehui zuzhi’ de xingzhi jieding yu bianxi” (The Perceptions of Under- world Criminal Activities in China), Dangdai Zhongguo Yanjiu (Modern China Studies),Spring 2005; Guo Zili, “Lun you zuzhi fanzui de gainian he tezheng (On the Concept and Special Characteristics of Organized Crime), Zhongwai Faxue (Peking University Law Jour-nal), Vol. 2, 1998; Gao Yifei, You zuzhi fanzui
    wenti zhuanlun (A Study on Whether there is a Problem of Organized Crime), Zhongguo zhengfa daxue chubanshe, 1999.
    4. According to Article 1 of the Supreme People’s Court Interpretation of Questions Concerning the Concrete Application of Laws in Adjudicating Cases Involving Mafia-Style Criminal Gangs (Guanyu shenli heishehui xingzhi zuzhi fanzui de anjian juti yingyou falü wenti de jieshi), issued on December 5, 2000, a “mafia-style criminal gang” must gen- erally have the following characteristics: (1) A fairly close-knit structure, substantial mem- bership and strict organizational discipline;  (2) generates income through illegal activity and has definite financial clout; (3) uses bribery and threats to induce or force state workers to participate in or protect illegal activities; (4) uses violence, threats and harassment for purposes of extortion, intimi- dation, and market or territorial dominance, seriously damaging the economic and social order.
    5. Translator’s note: On June 11, 2005, hun- dreds of men armed with shotguns, clubs and pipes attacked a group of farmers who were resisting official demands to surrender land
    to a state-owned power plant. Six farmers were killed and as many as 100 others were seriously injured. See “Chinese Peasants Attacked in Land Dispute,” Washington Post, Wednesday, June 15, 2005; “Land demon- strator killers sentenced to death in China,” Taipei Times, February 18, 2006.
    6. Translator’s note: In 2005, the residents of Taishi Village, Guangdong Province, signed a petition in accordance with the Village Com- mittee Organization Law to recall their village-committee director, whom they accused of illegally selling village land. The local govern- ment responded with a series of repressive actions, including attacks against villagers and their outside advocates by riot police and hired thugs. On this incident, see Hu Ping, “Taishi Village: A Sign of the Times,” China Rights Forum No. 4, 2005.